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TRUSTEE LIABILITY IN CERCLA: CONFRONTING THE
PROBLEMS AND PROPOSING SOLUTIONS
W. CARTER SANTOS*

In passing the Comprehensive Environmental, Response
Compensation, and Liability Act ("Superfund" or "CERCLA"),' Congress
intended to make "those responsible for problems caused by the disposal
of chemical poison" pay for the cleanup cost.2 Unfortunately, Congress
established a liability scheme which imposes liability on any entity that fits
into the vague definition of terms such as the current "owner" or
"operator" of a facility where a disposal has occurred3 or the "owner" or
"operator" of a facility at the time of disposal.' CERCLA does not define
these terms. An expansive reading could result in liability for parties who
are not responsible because they did not actually cause the disposal or
accept the risks associated with disposal (by purchasing the real estate).
Because CERCLA may impose staggering liability for the cost of cleaning
up property contaminated with hazardous substances and other "response
costs,"5 the apprehension over liability has caused tremendous concern for
entities who do not fit neatly into these definitions.
Inter vivos trustees and bankruptcy trustees are entities whose
liability status is uncertain. For instance, although an inter vivos trustee
holds title to trust real estate which could cause him to be labeled an
"owner," he does not benefit from the property or necessarily hold other
indicia of ownership. 6 A bankruptcy trustee has the power to operate the
debtor's business which could cause him to be labeled an "operator," but

* Mr. Santos received his B.A. in political science from Tulane University in 1992 and
expects to receive his J.D. from the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College of
William and Mary in May of 1995.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
2. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1989)
(quoting Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st
Cir. 1986)).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988).
4. Id § 9607(a)(2).

5. "Response costs" can include site inspections, mitigation efforts and government
litigation costs. See Roy M. Adams et al., Liabilityfor Environmental Hazards: The Saga
Continues, 132 Tr. & Est. 30 (Jan. 1993).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959).
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he cannot refuse to operate the business if doing so advances the
reorganization and liquidation purposes of the federal Bankruptcy Code
("Code").7 These two different forms of trustees have certain traits which
could bring them into the liability scheme of CERCLA, but they also
possess other traits and fulfill certain legal purposes which suggest they
should not incur CERCLA liability.
Congress did not fully consider the trustee's status when drafting
CERCLA. CERCLA was a "hurriedly drafted" 8 statute, and trustees were
not even mentioned in the Senate bill which introduced the strict liability
standard to CERCLA or in the committee report accompanying it.9
Furthermore the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), which was
delegated -enforcement power by the Act, until recently had "never given
a moment's thought" to a trustee's potential liability for contaminated
property.'0
Congress should be very concerned about trustees being held
personally liable under CERCLA. Trustees provide invaluable services to
Americans by managing trusts for many different purposes such as group
financial investments (one example being Real Estate Investment Trusts or
"REITS") and estate planning. Trustees are also the main operators of the
Code which was federally enacted to balance the complicated tension
between the debtor's interest in rehabilitation and the creditor's right to
payment." The entire Code revolves around the bankruptcy trustee and
would collapse without his guidance and decision making. 2 If trustees are
held personally liable solely due to their status as a trustee or for their

7. 11 U.S.C. §§ 721, 1108 (1988).
8. Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive EnvironmentalResponse,
Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 34
(1982) (quoting 126 CONG. REC. H11, 790 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980)).
9. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
10. Superfund: EnvironmentalCleanup Liabilityfor Trustees Next LandMine in CERCLA

Field, 22 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 2862 (Apr. 24, 1992) (quoting Michelle Corash, former

general counsel of EPA) [hereinafter Land Mine].
11. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-2075 (1988).
§§ 323 (official representative of estate), 327 (power to employ professional
12. E.g., id.
persons), 345 (power to deposit or invest estate money), 363 (power to use, sell or lease
property of estate), 364 (power to obtain credit), 365 (power to assume or reject executory
contracts), 366 (power to demand utility services), 501 (power to file a claim on behalf

of a creditor), 544-51 (power to avoid certain transfers and liens), 554 (power to abandon
property), 704 (duty to account for property, monitor the debtor's performance, investigate
debtor's financial affairs, object to debtor's discharge, file periodic financial reports), 1108
(power to operate debtor's business).
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performance of routine trust services, the entire trust industry could be
substantially altered. Many qualified trustees would step down from their
positions rather than face the risk of unlimited personal liability. Others
would charge outrageous fees in order to reflect the burden of potential
CERCLA liability. Bankruptcy judges would be faced with rejections
when attempting to appoint persons to be trustees of estates containing real
estate. In the extreme situation that no trustee would accept the position,
the debtor could be faced with the loss of his federal right to file
bankruptcy. Due to the possibility of harming an entire industry which
benefits so many Americans, Congress should reevaluate CERCLA in light
of the special problems posed by trustees.
This paper attempts to draw some straight lines into trustee liability
and to suggest legislative solutions in order to negative the uncertainty.
Trustees should not be held strictly liable (1) for merely holding title to
contaminated property or (2) for merely possessing the capacity to manage
trust property. Trustees should also (3) not be held strictly liable as
operators but should instead be held accountable on a negligence theory,
and (4) trustees should not be forced to choose between breaching
fiduciary duties or complying with CERCLA. Finally, this paper will
consider preventative measures.
I. No TRUSTEE LIABILITY FOR MERELY HOLDING TITLE
Under state law the creation of a trust requires the conveyance of
trust property to the trustee. 3 A trustee could incur personal liability under
CERCLA on the theory that the trustee is the "owner" because he holds
the title to the real estate. Yet, unlike other title holders who have been
held liable under CERCLA, the trustee serves a legal purpose which makes
it inherently unfair to hold him liable merely due to his status as title
holder. First, a trustee only holds legal title to enable him to manage
property on another's behalf (the beneficiary) and not for himself.'4
Although trustees are compensated for their services, they are not paid to
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 32 (1959). "[]f the owner of property makes

a conveyance inter vivos of the property to another to be held by him in trust for a third
person and the conveyance is not effective to transfer the property, no trust of the property
is created." Id. (emphasis added). "The creation of a. trust is conceived of as a
conveyance of the beneficial interest in the trust property rather than as a contract." Id.
§ 197 cmt. b.
14. Id. § 170. The trustee is under a duty of loyalty to the beneficiary; that is, he must
administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary. Id
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carry the burden of potential liability. Permitting one who does not benefit
from the fruits of the property to bear all the burdens of the property
would be unfair, especially when that person is not compensated for
bearing such a risk. Second, trustees only receive title due to a hoary
convention of common law which predates the coming of CERCLA and
is oblivious to its consequences. 15 A trustee could just as easily fulfill the
various fiduciary and management duties under the trust instrument without
holding title. Although a trustee could incur operator status as a manager
of a hazardous waste facility without holding title, most trustees manage
only the estate's finances and defer other physical management powers to
more capable persons. 6 Most importantly, holding trustees strictly liable
due to their status as title holders does not further the goal of CERCLA
which is to make those responsible for the problems caused by the disposal
of hazardous waste pay for the cost of cleaning up the contaminated
property. One could argue that current owners who buy contaminated
property are also not at fault but can still be held liable under CERCLA.
Current owners, however, accept the risk that they are buying contaminated
property when they pay for it, while the trustee accepts no such risk in
providing his services. Furthermore, an owner probably paid a much lower
price for the property if any red flags were raised from an environmental
audit, while a trustee's fees do not increase when such risks are present.
These policies illustrate the unfairness of holding trustees liable
solely for holding title to contaminated real estate. Yet, because Congress
did not define the term "owner," the trustee is left in the precarious
position of deferring his fate to the courts' interpretation of this term.
The courts have been inconsistent as to whether merely holding title
constitutes ownership under CERCLA. The ambiguous distinction between
title and ownership surfaced in United States v. Carolawn Co., '7 where the
defendant corporation moved for summary judgment on the issue of its
liability as an owner under section 107(a)(2) of CERCLA on the basis that
it was merely a "conduit" in a brief transfer of title between a bankruptcy
trustee and three individual defendants.1 8 The court dismissed the motion
15. Joel S. Moskowitz, Trustee Liability Under Cercla,21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,003, 10,004 (Jan. 1991).
16. See Steven L. Leifer & Nancy E. Allin, Trustee Executor Liability Under Superfund,
20 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1786, 1787 (Feb. 16, 1990).
17. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,698 (D.S.C. June 15, 1984).
18. Douglass M. Garrou, The Potentially Responsible Trustee: Probable Target for
CERCLA Liability,77 VA. L. REv. 113, 124 (1991) (quoting Carolawn,[1984] 14 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,698).
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stating that there was "room for controversy" on the issue.' 9 The court
stated: "Possession of title, or the lack thereof, is not necessarily
dispositive with respect to the questions of ownership . . . . 'While a
certificate of title is an indicium of ownership. . .[it] is not conclusive
evidence of ownership."' 2 Under Carolawn then, a trustee may be free
from CERCLA liability.
In In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.,2 however, the court implied that
holding title by itself can establish owner status in stating "There is no
question that, in at least one sense, the Port owns the Bergsoe recycling
plant: the deed to the property is in the name of the Port., 22 The court
found the defendant not liable due to the applicability of the secured
creditor exemption which excludes from the owner and operator definition
any person who, without participating in the management of a facility,
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the
facility. 23 Because the court held that the Port possessed title only to
secure a debt owed to them, the Port was exempted. The court stated:
"That the Port holds paper title to the Bergsoe plant does not, alone, make
it an owner of the facility for purposes of CERCLA; under the security
interest exemption the court must determine why the Port holds such
indicia of ownership."24 The implication is that if the defendant had not
held title for the purpose of securing an interest in the facility, liability as
an owner would have attached. Under Bergsoe, holding title would
constitute ownership.
The three cases which directly confront the trustee's status as title
holder are themselves ambiguous. In United States v. Burns, 25 the
defendant was the sole trustee and beneficiary of a trust that owned
contaminated property. The trustee moved to dismiss himself from liability
on the grounds that he had never owned the property and had never
personally participated in conduct prohibited by CERCLA.26 Indenying
the motion, the court noted that as trustee and beneficiary, the defendant
"possessed at least some evidence of ownership" of the property.27 The

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Carolawn at 20,699.
Id. (quoting Justice v. Fabey, 541 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1982)).
910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
Id.at 671-72. See also Garrou, supra note 18, at 125.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
Bergsoe Metal, 910 F.2d at 671.
No. 88-94-L, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20837, at *1 (D.N.H. Sept. 12, 1988).
Id.
Id at *4.
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court failed to clarify whether holding title as trustee or the fact that the
trustee was also the beneficiary was the evidence of ownership to which
it referred.28 The court shed some light on the issue by stating "Congress
did not intend for a responsible party to be able to avoid liability through
9
the use of a trust or other forms of ownership."2 Because the trustee was
also the beneficiary when the contamination occurred, the court must have
felt that the trustee was using the trust solely to shield himself from
potential personal liability which he undoubtedly would have incurred had
he simply been the fee simple owner of the property. Although Burns can
be interpreted as holding a trustee liable for mere possession of title, it
may be limited to the situation in which the trustee is also the
beneficiary.30
Another case confronting trustee liability, UnitedStates v. Petersen
Sand and Gravel,3 concentrated on other indicia of ownership and deemphasized that the trustee held title.32 In that case, a land trust had
previously owned a contaminated site, and the current owner sued the
former trustee bank of the land trust for contribution as a potentially
responsible party.33 On the issue of its status as owner, the bank was
granted summary judgment.34 The court stated that, although the trustee
of a land trust did possess title, the beneficiary possessed the incidents of
ownership that dealt with the use of the property such as the right to
manage, control and possess the property.35 The court felt that actual
36
control of the property was more important than holding title to it.
Petersen, however, may also have limited application. First, by
retaining complete power to control the property, the beneficiary seemed
to be using the trust merely as a shield from liability. The court may have
found against the beneficiary and for the trustee on that point. Second,
28. See Adams et al., supra note 5, at 32.
29. No. 88-94-L, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20837, at *4 (D.N.H. Sept. 12, 1988).
30. See Adams et al., supra note 5, at 32.
1992).
31. 806 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. I11.
32. It is important to distinguish between indicia of ownership, which can include those
powers associated with owning property, and operator activities, which include those
decisions and activities relating to the operation of a facility. Because this case grapples
with the issue of what powers and rights constitute ownership, the former is at issue.
33. Petersen, 806 F. Supp. at 1346. CERCLA expressly provides that if the government
holds a party liable under the Act, that party may seek contribution from other potentially
responsible parties ("PRPs"). 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (1988).
34. Petersen, 806 F. Supp. at 1359.
35. Id.at 1358.
36. Id.at 1358-59.
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conventional trusts, unlike land trusts, usually allocate a significant amount
of power to the trustee over the trust assets. Had the trustee had the power
to manage and control the property, the court may have found the trustee
liable for possessing sufficient ownership indicia. In other words, the
trustee would have possessed a sufficient amount of the powers and rights
associated with owning property to be labeled an owner.
More
importantly, however, under Petersen a trustee would not incur liability
merely for holding title without any other indicia of ownership.
The most recent case to address the issue of a trustee as an owner
for holding title is City of Phoenix v. Garbage Services Co. 7 This case
involved a trust which executed a repurchase option on a piece of real
estate in 1966.38 At that time, Garbage Services Company ("GSC")
managed the site as a landfill.39 The trustee continued to permit GSC to
operate the landfill until 1972 when it was shut down.40 The trustee paid
the landfill's property taxes and insurance fees but did not participate in
the daily operation of the facility. 41 In 1980 the City of Phoenix
condemned the property and in 1989 it alleged that the trustee was liable
for response costs under CERCLA as a matter of law because the trustee
held title to the property.42 The court agreed but was reluctant in doing so:
It may seem unjust to subject trustees that are not involved
in the contamination of the property to liability for cleanup
that, in some cases, may far exceed the value of the trust's
assets. But, . . . a defendant's degree of culpability has
nothing to do with owner/operator liability under CERCLA.
If Congress had meant to exempt uninvolved trustees from
liability as "owners" under CERCLA, it would have said so
in the statute.43
The court conceded the unfairness in holding an unresponsible trustee
liable for merely holding title but believed that Congress must have
intended trustees to be liable because Congress did not exempt them like

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

816 F. Supp. 564 (D. Ariz. 1993).
Id. at 566.
Id.
Id
Id. at 566-67.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 568.
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the secured creditors." However, the court, by assuming Congress was
speaking by being silent, was misled in its analysis.
Congress probably did not consider trustees when drafting the Act.
Senate bill 1480 introduced the strict liability section to the bill which
ultimately passed as CERCLA.45 In S. 1480 and in the report issued on it
by the Committee on Environment and Public Works,46 trustees are not
discussed or even mentioned.47 The only logical reason secured creditors
received an exemption, and trustees did not, is because the lending
industry was better represented during CERCLA's drafting. The industry's
greater lobbying effort likely was due to the fact that lenders had more
4
1
reason to fear CERCLA liability as an obvious deep pocket "owner.,
Lenders finance most real estate purchases, giving them varying degrees
of control over the real estate through loan conditions and foreclosure
rights when purchasers become insolvent due to environmental liability or
otherwise. Thus, lenders would take title at the worst time, when
contamination had already occurred. By contrast, a trustee is not usually
involved with the purchase or foreclosure of real estate but instead
manages trust property which may include real estate with hazardous waste
problems. Furthermore, the trust industry probably never considered a
trustee to be the actual "owner" of trust property because a settlor or
beneficiary would always be the benefitting party.
To confuse the issue further, the decision on ownership liability in
Garbage Services was, in effect, reversed on a later motion to limit the
liability of the trustee. 49 The court agreed that a trustee was liable as title

44. Id.

45. See Grad, supra note 8, at 7.
46. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
47. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), 126 CONG. REC. S14,938-48 (daily ed. Nov.
24, 1980). The report justifies the imposition of strict liability on the theory that the
creation of hazardous waste is an ultrahazardous activity. At common law a person
owning property on which ultrahazardous activities were performed was strictly liable for
damages resulting therefrom. See Grad, supra note 8, at 9. It does not necessarily follow,

however, that the trustee holding title for the benefit of another would be liable for
damages associated with ultrahazardous activity at common law any more than the trustee
would be liable for hazardous waste activities under CERCLA. In both cases, the issue
is the same, and Congress has not resolved it.
48. "Lender Liability" has become increasingly prominent in the last decade as lenders
have been held liable under a variety of statutes including the Bankruptcy Code, RICO,
the U.C.C. and environmental statutes. RAYMOND T. NIMMER & INGRID M. HILLINGER,
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: SECURED FINANCING 28-32 (1992).

49. See City of Phoenix v. Garbage Servs. Co., 827 F. Supp. 600 (D. Ariz. 1993).
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holder but found that CERCLA was silent on the extent of such liability,
noting that "'It is not surprising that, as a hastily conceived and briefly
debated piece of legislation, CERCLA failed to address many important
issues."' 5 The court decided to create a federal common law rule which
reflected the common law of trusts in order to avoid disrupting existing
commercial relations predicated on state law.5 The federal rule was based
on section 265 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts which stated that,
where liability is imposed on a trustee because he is the title holder of the
property, a trustee is liable only to the extent to which the trust estate is
sufficient to indemnify him.52 The court then held that as title holder of
the property, a trustee could only be held liable to the extent of the trust
assets." Thus, the teeth of the prior ruling, which called for unlimited
personal liability, were pulled. GarbageServices illustrates the uncertainty
courts face in having to reconcile the vague, undefined terms of CERCLA
with the unresponsible trustee who merely holds title to contaminated
property. In sum, the judicial and governmental position on whether
holding title constitutes ownership is inconsistent and, at best, very
ambiguous.
Proper amendments to CERCLA or state trust law could establish
safe harbors for trustees while still fulfilling the objectives of CERCLA.
In 1990, New York Representative John La Falce introduced a bill54 into
the House of Representatives that would have exempted "corporate
trustees" from ownership status under CERCLA."5 There seemed to be two
reasons for its death in the Energy and Commerce Committee.5 6 First, the
exemption of corporate trustees is illogical since there is little difference
in the purposes behind corporate and inter vivos trusts.5 7 Second, the bill
would have exempted the trustee without the corollary right of holding the
estate liable.5" The bill's effect would have been that if contaminated trust

50. Id. at 602 (quoting Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86,

91 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989)).
51. Id. at 603. This is also consistent with United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964
F.2d 252, 268 n.26 (3d Cir. 1992), in which the Restatement (Second) of Torts rule of
divisibility was applied to CERCLA.
52. GarbageServs., 827 F. Supp. at 605.

53. Id.
54. H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
55. Moskowitz, supra note 15, at 10,005.

56. See id
57. Id.
58. See id.
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property could not be used for cleanup, the estate would receive a windfall
remediation from the Superfund or not ever have to clean up the
property. 9 The bill may have had a chance at passing if it had included
all inter vivos trustees and clarified the right to reach trust assets for
cleanup liability even if the title lie elsewhere.
The court in Burns mentioned one danger in passing this modified
version of the bill. The bill may create a loophole for landowners to
escape liability by transferring contaminated property to a trust while
keeping liquid assets and uncontaminated property out of trust.60 An
exception should be made in the amendment for conveyances made by the
transferor in bad faith; that is, those which were designed to avoid
CERCLA liability. If the transferor conveyed the property to a trust
because he knew disposal was likely, then liability would attach to the
transferor. If the disposal occurred before the conveyance to the trustee,
then the transferor should be held solely liable under section 107(a)(2) as
the owner at the time of disposal. Under either scenario the entity
responsible for the disposal would be punished and not the innocent
trustee.
An alternative would be to amend state law by providing that the
trust, rather than the trustee, takes title to the real estate. 6' Although this
offends conventional trust law, trustees should be willing to bend this
convention rather than face the prospect of unlimited liability under
CERCLA.
The other entity, the bankruptcy trustee, need not confront the
issue of whether holding title constitutes ownership. In In re T.P. Long
Chemical, Inc.,62 the bankruptcy trustee was held not liable as a title
holding owner because under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, the
bankruptcy estate, and not the trustee, holds title to property of the estate.63
The court then noted that property of the debtor's estate could be used to

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,635 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Jan. 3, 1985).
63. See id. at 20,637. The filing of a bankruptcy petition creates an estate separate
the debtor and trustee. The estate itself holds title to all of the debtor's property.
trustee's only relation to the estate is that he manages the property. See id.
commencement of a case under § 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate.
estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by whomever
." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).

from
The
"The
Such
held:
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satisfy CERCLA claims.' Bankruptcy courts have continued to follow this
precedent, and the issue has not been subsequently raised.

II. No TRUSTEE LIABILITY FOR MERELY POSSESSING
THE CAPACITY TO MANAGE

Even if a trustee can persuade a court that he is not an owner for
merely holding title to contaminated trust property, the trustee may be
deemed an owner for possessing other indicia of ownership; that is, having
the authority to control the use of the property. These management powers
include the power to lease, possess or control the property.65 Under trust
instruments, trustees are often given significant power over both the
management and financial affairs of trust property. In virtually all
situations, however, trustees only exercise their financial powers relating
to matters regarding property taxes, financing, investments, insurance
liability and liquidation efforts, while actual management activities, like
those mentioned above, are deferred to those who were in control prior to
the creation of the trust agreement. 66 This occurs simply because the
trustee usually knows very little about effective management or about the
specific operations and activities of the trust property. When trustees only
manage the financial affairs of the trust and are not involved in the actual
management of the trust property, trustees should not be held liable as
owners for holding unexercised powers incident to ownership.
First, holding trustees liable in such a scenario will not advance the
purpose of CERCLA which is to force those who cause the disposal or
who accept the risk of disposal to pay for the cost of cleaning up the
property. Trustees do not accept the risk of CERCLA liability when they
provide trustee services (as current owners do when they purchase real
estate) nor do their fees increase when they become a trustee of a trust

64. T.P. Long Chemical, [1985] 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,638.
65. In United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, 653 F. Supp. 984
(D.S.C. 1984), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub nom. United States v. Monsanto Co.,
858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989), a lessee, who did not
hold title to the property, incurred owner liability for subletting the property to a sublessee
who contaminated it. Id. at 1002-03. Leasing, notwithstanding the absence of title, can
by itself be seen as an incident of ownership which can serve as a basis for owner
liability. See id. at 1003.
66. See Liefer & Allin, supra note 16, at 1787.
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67
holding real estate. Furthermore, trustees who are not participating in the
daily activities which resulted in the disposal did not cause the disposal in
fact and could not have prevented it. Holding them liable would
encourage trustees to take over the operations of the property or facility
immediately upon becoming trustee without having the necessary skills or
knowledge to do so. Imprudent decision-making in these types of cases
could lead to CERCLA violations or at least to an increased risk of such
8
violations. Furthermore, under State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp."
a trustee could incur liability for "a threat of release" if he took over the
operations of the facility without the requisite expertise in handling
hazardous waste. 69 Such time-consuming activity would also lead to the
neglect of the traditional purpose of trustees which is to handle the
financial affairs of trust property for the beneficiary.
Second, a secured creditor receives an exemption from ownership
status when its only involvement with the entity is in assisting in its
financial affairs. 7' There is a strong argument that the trustee should be
entitled to similar protection because his normal role is one of financial
facilitator.71 The Mirabile decision held that a secured creditor would be
exempt where he did not exercise day-to-day or operational control over
7
the management of the entity causing the disposal. ' The court noted:
"the participation which is critical [to incur liability] is participation in
operational, production, or waste disposal activities. Mere financial ability
to control waste disposal practices . . . is not . . . sufficient for the
imposition of liability. 73

67. Trustee fee arrangements do not reflect higher charges for administering trusts with
real estate because trustees are not aware of their potential liability and, even if they are,
consider the risk very low. However, as this paper suggests, the risk is very real, and as
EPA, state environmental agencies and private parties search for deeper pockets, actions
against trustees will increase dramatically.
68. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
69. Id.at 1045. Liability can be incurred by an owner or operator for the release or
threat of release of hazardous substances. Corroding and deteriorating tanks, the
operator's lack of experience or the failure to license a facility could all result in a "threat
of release."
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
71. Leifer et al., supra note 16, at 1787.
72. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,995 (E.D.
Pa. 1985).
73. Id.
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Although the infamous Eleventh Circuit case Fleet Factors4 held
differently, its holding has been denounced by EPA,75 and other courts
have consistently followed Mirabile rather than Fleet Factors.76 The
trustee and lender entities are similar in two important ways which should
result in treating them the same under CERCLA. First, their relations to
the principal are the same in that their objective is to ensure financial
stability for the principal-the trustee so that the trust makes money for the
beneficiary and the lender so that the loan obligations of the debtor are
fulfilled. Second, both often have the capacity to influence the operation's
decisions; the trustee by the powers delegated in the trust instrument and
the lender by its ability to cut the purse strings for environmental
noncompliance as loan conditions. These similarities support the assertion
made earlier that the only reason lenders received an exemption and
trustees did not is that the lending industry was better represented during
the drafting of CERCLA. Not being able to enjoy the safe harbor of an
exemption from liability for mere financial assistance to the trust
enterprise, the trustee must depend on whether the Court's interpretation of
owner will include those possessing the power to control management
operations.
In the Petersen case mentioned above, the court held the beneficiary
who did not hold title to the contaminated property liable as an owner for
possessing other indicia of ownership which theoretically gave him the
capacity to control disposals on the site." Because the trustee often
possesses the same powers which the beneficiary held in Petersen-the

74. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that
a secured creditor may incur § 107(a)(2) owner liability by participating in the financial
management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the entity's

treatment of hazardous waste).
75. EPA denounced the Fleet Factorsdecision by issuing a Lender Liability Rule in 1992
which provided safe harbors for secured lenders which were explicitly prohibited under
the Fleet Factors decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
recently ruled that EPA exceeded its statutory authority, which is limited to regulatory
authority, in promulgating a rule which affects the liability of parties. EPA's Lender
Liability Rule Held Invalid Under Superfund Law, 62 U.S.L.W. 1117 (Feb. 15, 1994).

Because the decision is at the appeal level in a district court, it is not certain what affect
it will have in other districts where the decision is not controlling. If Congress agrees
with EPA's rule, it may decide to enact it legislatively.
76. In Ashland Oil v. SanfordProd Corp., 810 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Minn. 1993), the court
held that a lender engaging in normal lending activities is shielded from liability under
CERCLA, Mirabile, and EPA's 1992 lender liability rule.
77. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
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power to possess, control and manage the property-via the trust
agreement, the case is troubling for trustees. Under Petersen, a trustee
could be held personally liable if the trust instrument gives him
management powers, even if the trustee never engaged in any decisionmaking whatsoever regarding the management of the property.
The only case to confront the issue of trustee liability based on the
trustee's capacity to control management activity of the facility is Garbage
Services.7" The defendant was the trustee of a trust which included a
landfill.79 The trustee took a "hands-off' approach with regard to the daily
management of the landfill and concerned itself only with the financial
matters of the trust, which included paying the landfill's property tax and
liability insurance."0 GSC was the sole party managing the operations of
the landfill and had been doing so years before the trust purchased the
landfill."1 During the tenure of the trustee and while GSC was managing
the property, a disposal in violation of CERCLA occurred. 2 The district
court held the trustee personally liable as an owner for holding title. 3 On
a motion by the trustee to limit his damages to the assets of the trust,
however, the court issued a federal common law rule which, in effect,
altered the basis for liability." The court first stated that a trustee could
be held liable for merely holding title as an owner under section 107(a)(1)
or (2) but only to the extent the trust assets were sufficient to indemnify
him. 5 The court then stated that the trustee could be held personally
liable, in excess of the trust assets, under section 107(a)(2) as an owner at
the time of disposal if: (1) the trustee had the power to control the use of
the trust property and (2) the trustee knowingly allowed the property to be
used for the disposal of hazardous wastes.8 6 Because the trust instrument
provided that the trustee "shall have full power to hold, manage, operate,
control, lease, improve and repair" trust property, there was little doubt as
to the trustee's capacity to control the operations at the landfill.8 7 In light
of the trust instrument and the trustee's knowledge of the landfill activity,

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See GarbageServs., 827 F. Supp. at 600.
Id. at 602.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 603.
Id at 605.
Id.
Id. at 607.
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the court concluded as a matter of88 law that the trustee could be held
personally liable for response costs.

In an effort to avoid disrupting commercial relationships predicated
on state trust law, the court tried to fashion this rule in a way consistent
with section 264 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts which subjected the
trustee to personal liability for torts committed in the course of the
administration of the trust.8 9 The court believed that the trustee had
committed a strict liability tort in that the disposal of hazardous wastes
could be classified as a violation of the common law claim of
ultrahazardous activity.9° Therefore, if the trustee possessed the requisite
incidents of ownership and control (the capacity to operate the property)
and the trustee knew that ultrahazardous activity was occurring (a tort if
released), then holding the trustee liable would be consistent with section
264 and CERCLA.9 This test provides some protection to the trustee. If the trustee is
completely ignorant of any hazardous waste disposal on the land, then the
second prong of the GarbageServices analysis will not be satisfied. If the
trust instrument does not give the trustee power to control the operation of
the property, then the first prong will not be satisfied. However, there are
two problems with the court's analysis. First, a trustee can still be
severally punished by incurring unlimited liability under this standard even
though he has committed no wrong. Section 264 of the Restatement does
not confront the issue of strict liability when a trustee is not at fault and
is a mere title holder; rather, it discusses liability when the trustee is at
fault. The court's connection between CERCLA and the Restatement is,
at best, tenuous. Second, the trustee should not be labelled an owner for
merely holding the unexercised capacity to control the management of the
trust property. It does not.satisfy the goal of CERCLA-to make
responsible parties pay for cleanup costs----to punish a party who did not
participate in the activity which caused the disposal.
Amending the owner definition of CERCLA to include an
exemption for trustees could remedy the problem. Of course, the
exemption would have to be limited to situations where the trustee
participated only in the financial affairs of the trust estate and did not
participate in the daily management of the facility. If evidence showed

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at 603.
Id.
Id. at 604.
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that the trustee did exercise management powers with regard to the trust
property containing the facility, the exemption should not apply. In the
meantime, before contracting to become a trustee of trusts holding real
estate, a trustee should strike any language in the trust instrument which
delegates any control or managerial power over that real estate to himself.

Although a bankruptcy trustee does not possess title to the property
of the bankruptcy estate, the bankruptcy trustee does possess certain
incidents of ownership which could bring him into the ambit of owner

liability. Pursuant to section 363 of the Code, the trustee can "use, sell or
lease" property of the estate.9 2 The trustee can also operate the debtor's
business. 93 Under Petersen, the beneficiary incurred liability. Like the
bankruptcy trustee, the beneficiary did not possess title to the property
where the disposal occurred but did possess certain powers evidencing
ownership of the property such as the power to control, possess or manage
the property. Likewise, in Garbage Services, the court held the trustee
liable for the unexercised capacity to manage the trust property where the
disposal occurred.9'
However, out of the many bankruptcy cases where the bankruptcy
trustee could have been charged with owner liability, In re T.P. Long,
Inc.95 is the only case to question the bankruptcy trustee's status as a
nonowner. After T.P. Long Chemical Company filed for bankruptcy, a
trustee was appointed under Chapter 7 to liquidate the property of the
estate.9 6 Although most of the property of the estate was sold at an
auction, a tank containing sulfur monochloride 97 remained on the site.9
Through an act of vandalism, a former associate opened a valve on the
tank resulting in the release of hazardous substances.99 The trustee argued
that since the bankruptcy estate held title to the property of the estate, the
estate and not the trustee was the owner. The court agreed but noted that:

92. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1988).
93. A Chapter 7 trustee can operate the debtor's business for the purpose of facilitating
liquidation under § 704 of the Code. See id. § 704. A Chapter 11 trustee or the debtor
in possession may operate the business of the debtor under § 1108 for the purpose of
rehabilitating the debtor. See id. § 1108.
94. GarbageServs., 827 F. Supp. at 607.
95. TP. Long Chemical, [1985] 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,635
96. Id. at 20,636.
97. Sulfur monochloride isa hazardous substance as defined by § 101(14) of CERCLA.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988).
98. TP. Long Chemical, [1985] 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,636.
99. Id.

TRUSTEE LIABILITY

1994]

In the sense that the trustee did not acquire title to the
property of the estate, he is technically correct that he is not
the owner of the Long facility. [However] . . the
Bankruptcy Code does provide him with certain powers
associated with ownership. Chief among these powers is
the power to use, sell or lease property of the estate.... "
This remark suggests that the absence of title may not, in all instances, be
conclusive as to the question of owner status. The court seems to indicate
that if these powers had been exercised, there would have been a stronger
case for liability.
Under T.P. Long, it appears that a bankruptcy trustee could incur
liability as an owner due to the powers incident to ownership that he
possesses under the Code. However, a bankruptcy trustee doubtfully
would ever be held liable on an ownership theory. In actions against
bankruptcy trustees, courts have consistently extended greater protection to
bankruptcy trustees than that afforded common law trustees.'0 ' There are
several basic reasons for this added protection. First, although the
unsecured creditors can elect a trustee, 0 2 the trustee is usually appointed
by the U.S. Trustee. 0 3 Because the U.S. Trustee is a constant fixture in
the bankruptcy court, bankruptcy trustees are often seen as "arms of the
court"; ° that is, their actions and decisions are regarded as an extension
of the court's judicial power. Second, the demands of public policy as

100. Id. at 20,637.

101. See generally Sherr v. Winkler, 552 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1977); Ziegler v. Pitney,
139 F.2d 595, (2d Cir. 1943); Riedell v. Stuart, 2 P.2d 929 (Okla. 1931).
102. 11 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). If requested by a sufficient number of creditors at the §
341 meeting, an election for a trustee can take place.
103. Id. § 701. After the order for relief an interim trustee is appointed by the U.S.
Trustee. If the unsecured creditors do not elect a trustee at the 341 creditor's meeting,
the interim trustee becomes the trustee in the case. Id § 702(d).
104. Sherr, 552 F.2d at 1376. Trustees were appointed by the court before the enactment
of the present Bankruptcy Code in 1979 and this 1977 court's statement reflects that
scenario. However, the "arm of the court" analogy still holds some weight today when
one considers that the U.S. Trustee is a constant fixture of the bankruptcy court. When
two parties, not adversial in nature, are forced to work closely together for a common
goal, the two parties are perceived to be on the same team and a structural bias is likely
to occur.
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described in the Code limit a bankruptcy trustee's degree of discretion;'0 °
that is, a bankruptcy trustee must follow the demands of the Code in
meeting the objectives for the chapter under which the debtor files.
Common law trustees are not restricted in this manner; in fact, they can
negotiate the terms of the trust agreement which controls the types of
power that the trustee possesses over the trust property. Third, when a
trustee is appointed in a Chapter 11 Reorganization, the proceedings are so
complicated that extra protection is often warranted. 10 6 Fourth, if
bankruptcy trustees are held liable regardless of fault under the ownershiplike powers given to them by the Code for merely being appointed to
administer an estate, many trustees would refuse appointments. Without
trustees the bankruptcy code could not work, and the system would
collapse. Surely, in enacting CERCLA, Congress did not intend to take
even one small step down this road.
With regard to CERCLA liability, a separate reason for not holding
the trustee liable, except where the Code permits, is that the Code is
federal law. As such, the Code must be treated on an equitable basis with
other federal laws such as CERCLA. If there is a conflict, equal weight
must be given to the intent of Congress in passing both laws before a
decision can be reached. This analysis does not apply when state trust law
is involved because- state law, under the Supremacy Clause,0 7 must yield
to federal law when a conflict exists. In sum, although it is theoretically
possible to hold a bankruptcy trustee liable as owner due to the indicia of
ownership he possesses under the Code, such a holding is not likely
considering the policy reasons against such a finding and the fact that only
one bankruptcy case has even considered the possibility. To foreclose the
issue, CERCLA could be amended to exclude bankruptcy trustees
completely from the definition of "owner."

105. Ziegler, 139 F.2d at 596. Under Chapter 7 the trustee must liquidate the estate in
an orderly fashion so as to provide creditors with the maximum amount of payment for
their claims. In Chapter l Ithe trustee must operate the business, cut losses and manage
the affairs of the business in a manner which allows for rehabilitation and reorganization.
See D. Ethan Jeffrey, Personal Liability of a Bankruptcy Trustee Since Midlantic
National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection: The Environmental
Law and Bankruptcy Code Conflict Threatens to Engulf Bankruptcy Trustees 2 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 403, 405-407 (1991).
106. Sherr, 552 F.2d at 1376. "[T]he distinction between trustees in bankruptcy and
ordinary trustees or fiduciaries in terms of degree of discretion is based on public
policies recognizing the complications of bankruptcy proceedings." Id.
107. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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III. TRUSTEE LIABILITY AS AN OPERATOR BASED
ON A NEGLIGENCE STANDARD

Even if a trustee can persuade a court that he is not an owner for
purposes of CERCLA, the trustee may come into the ambit of the
definition of operator. Although CERCLA does not define operator, a
House Report accompanying one of the versions of the Act defined it as
"a person who is carrying out the operational functions for the owner of
the facility pursuant to an appropriate agreement."' 08 In Edward Hines
Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials. Co.,' 09 the court elaborated: "The
decisions uniformly hold that Congress intended to impose [operator]
liability.., only on those parties who actually operate or exercise control
over the facility.""' If an entity fits into the definition of an operator, the
entity is held strictly liable. Yet, the legal purpose of the trustee entity and
the historical tenets of trust law make it unfair and undesirable to hold
trustees liable absent some standard of fault. First, holding trustees strictly
liable would be a gross departure from orthodox trust law which insulates
trustees from personal liability absent negligence."' Such a rule could
severely limit the use of a trust as a form of real estate ownership, and the
potentially large cleanup cost might well dissuade trustees from ever
becoming involved. Second, in the traditional scenario a trustee could
insure against personal liability and thus control the risks of his trustee
capacity. Today, however, the staggering cost of CERCLA liability
renders the trustee's position virtually uninsurable.! 2
A consideration of how courts have treated similarly situated
defendants illustrates how the courts may treat trustees faced with potential
operator liability. The courts have struggled with the idea of holding
individuals personally liable as operators who are shielded from liability
108. H.R. REP. No. 85, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CA.N.
6119,6181.
109. 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1988).

110. Id. at 657.
111. William L. Hoey, Personal Liability of Trustees Under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and LiabilityAct, 68 U. DET. L. REV. 73 (Fall

1990). Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 264 (1959) provides: "The trustee is subject to
personal liability to third persons for torts committed in the course of the administration
of the trust to the same extent that he would be if he held the property free of trust."
Under § 265, absent fault, "Where a liability to third persons is imposed [on the trustee].
• . because he is the holder of the title to property, a trustee... is subject to personal
liability, but only to the extent to which the trust estate is sufficient to indemnify him."
112. Hoey, supra note 111, at 73.

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 19:69

under conventional state law. For corporate officers, the courts have
designed what has been called a "judicial fault" test which could apply to
trustees who, like corporate officers, are not mentioned specifically by
CERCLA and are shielded under state law absent fault."' In Kelly v.
Thomas Solvent Co."' the court explained the problem:
Imposing liability on a corporate individual is a serious
matter, and because CERCLA provides no explicit way to
distinguish among corporate actors, the courts should
respond with proper standards. Strict liability may be too
harsh and too broad-sweeping a standard to apply to all
corporate 'owners' in all cases. . . . [a] more definitive
standard seems appropriate." 5
Thus, for an entity similar to that of the trustee in which a broad range of
defendants with varying degrees of culpability as operatorsare present and
face potentially unlimited liability, the Kelly court decided to form a
standard of its own." 6
The test looks to evidence of the individual's responsibility to
control the waste-handling practices of the facility and the degree of
authority over the corporation vested in the officer." 7 Responsibilities for
waste disposal which were neglected would support the finding of
liability."' In order to encourage CERCLA compliance, "active, direct,
knowing efforts to prevent or abate" contamination would militate against
finding the corporate officer liable." 9 This analysis would give officers an
incentive to face waste problems when they occur rather than ignore them
in the hopes that their ignorance will preclude liability. In sum, the
standard requires more accountability for those with more authority over
the control of hazardous waste decisions.
The trustee could face a similar test for operator liability. The
trustee's responsibility to control the operations of the facility will depend
on the duties allotted the trustee and the powers given to the trustee in the
trust instrument. If such duties and powers are nonexistent or slight, then
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Garrou, supra note 18, at 136.
727 F. Supp. 1532 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
Id.at 1543.
See Garrou, supra note 18, at 137.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Kelly, 727 F. Supp. at 1544).
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the trustee should not be held liable because he could not have prevented
the disposal from occurring. In the other extreme scenario, if the trustee
has the duty under the trust agreement to control such operations and
actively participates to prevent or abate any disposal, these acts will serve
to preclude or limit the trustee's liability. Under the latter situation, if the
trustee does not participate in the operation of the facility to prevent
disposal, the trustee should be held accountable for his negligent omission
to act where a duty was present. However, if the trustee does not possess
such a duty but the trust instrument gives the trustee the power to operate
the facility, the trustee should not be held liable where the trustee has not
participated in preventing a disposal. Holding the trustee liable here would
essentially result in holding him liable for his unexercised capacity to
control the facility. As discussed in the section above, this would be
unfair. Although the "fault inquiry" provides some protection, the trustee
could still face liability where he has not been at fault.
The one case confronting the issue of operator liability for a trustee,
GarbageServices, provides the trustee with more protection than would the
"fault inquiry" test. 2° The City of Phoenix relied on this statement in the
KaiserAluminum case' 2 ' as a basis for trustee liability as an operator: "the
defendant was not liable under CERCLA as an operator because he had no
authority to control the day-to-day operation of the plant."'2 Because the
trust instrument provided the trustee with ample authority to control the
operation of the facility, the City of Phoenix asserted that mere authority
to control operations was sufficient to impose operator liability.,
The
court did not agree.' 24 It held that liability as an operator attaches only
where the defendant had actual control over the day-to-day management
and administration of the facility.' 25 The evidence showed that the trustee
was not involved at all in the day-to-day administration of the landfill but
that the landfill's manager, GSC was in charge.' 26 The trustee did not enter
into or negotiate contracts for the disposal of wastes at the landfill, the
trustee did not know the identity of GSC's customers, and the trustee's
communication with GSC employees was limited to matters involving the
120. See City of Phoenix v. Garbage Servs. Co., 816 F. Supp. 564, 567 (D. Ariz., 1993).
121. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. James L. Ferry & Son, Inc., 22 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,020 (9th Cir. 1992).
122. GarbageServs., 816 F. Supp. at 567.
123. See supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.

124. Id
125. Id.
126. Id.
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financial affairs of the estate.' 2 Garbage Services would preclude operator
liability in all situations except where the trustee was involved in the dayto-day management of the facility. On the other hand, under the "fault
inquiry" test, liability could theoretically be incurred on a lesser threshold;
28
that is, if the trustee had the capacity to control operations of the facility.
of
Garbage Services is more consistent with the House Report definition 29
trustee.
the
of
part
the
on
involvement
actual
requires
it
owner, in that
Because the "fault inquiry" has not yet been applied to trustees, and
the validity of the GarbageServices test is in question due to the federal
common law rule established on a subsequent motion to limit the trustee's
liability, 30 the trustee again does not know what act or failure to act can
cause liability. Proper legislation could remedy this situation. By
codifying the Garbage Services test, Congress would protect a trustee
unless he participated in the daily management of the facility. However,
a broader protection could be given which is consistent with state common
law by requiring some degree of fault before the trustee can incur personal
liability. The following language may suffice: "The term 'operator' shall
not include trustees except to the extent that a trustee's act, or failure to act
where there is a duty under the trust agreement, causes or increases
3
contamination or results in a threatened release.'' ' Although the former
solution provides some protection, the latter would be consistent with state
trust law. It will protect the trustee where the trustee is involved with the
daily management of the facility but does not act negligently in causing a
disposal. Although a trustee could be an operator under present law, an
argument exists that only the trust's assets should be used to clean up the
site. Otherwise, who would accept a trustee position to a trust which
contains property with a landfill on it?
Bankruptcy trustees could fall into the ambit of operator liability by
32
Although
exercising their power to operate the debtor's business.
cases
state
issue,
the
addressed
CERCLA cases have not specifically
interpreting state strict liability law have; and these cases provide some
guidance as to how CERCLA would be applied. In State of Wisconsin v.
Better Brite Plating, Inc.,'" the court rejected a strict liability standard as
127. Id.
128. See Garrou, supra note 18, at 137.

129. See supra notes 78-91 and accompanying text.
130. Id.
131. This language was created by the author.
(32. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1988).
'133. 466 N.W.2d 239 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
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it applied to a bankruptcy trustee. Better Brite had been operating a
chrome and zinc plating shop in violation of the Wisconsin Hazardous
Waste Management Act ("WHWM") since 1978 by discharging untreated
waste water into the city's sewer system.13 4 In 1985 Better Brite filed
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 before converting to Chapter 7 and
appointing a new trustee."3 During both the Chapter 7 and Chapter 11
trustees' tenures, the trustees exercised the Code's power to operate the
business, and the WHWM violations continued. 136 The trial court held the
trustees personally liable for waste generated during their tenure as
trustees. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a
bankruptcy trustee could not be held personally liable for his actions unless
the trustee "knowingly and intentionally" violated the statute.11 7 The court
adopted this standard from the Tenth Circuit's test in Sherr v. Winkler 3 '
which was based on the policy considerations mentioned earlier favoring
greater protection for bankruptcy trustees. The court specifically noted that
the standard reflects "a tacit recognition that federal bankruptcy law must
be accommodated when it conflicts with areas covered by the state's
' 39
environmental laws.'
Better Brite provides bankruptcy trustees great protection with
regard to state environmental law, but CERCLA, as a federal law, may
treat them differently. An "intentional" standard is unlikely to apply
because the strong public policy underlying CERCLA of cleaning up the
environment cannot be properly fulfilled if trustees are protected except
when they intentionally violate CERCLA. To accommodate CERCLA's
policies, the bankruptcy trustee should be held to a negligence standard.
Bankruptcy trustees may have certain defenses inherent in the Code,
however, which prevent them from being held responsible, notwithstanding
their negligence. Because the Chapter 7 trustee cannot operate a debtor's
business without prior approval by the bankruptcy court, 4 ° liability will
depend on the extent to which the court authorized the activity resulting in

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Jeffrey, supra note 105, at 428.
Id.
Id.See also Better Brite, 466 N.W.2d at 246.
Better Brite, 466 N.W.2d at 242.
552 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1977).
Better Brite, 466 N.W.2d at 246.
11 U.S.C. § 721 (1988). "The court may authorize the trustee to operate the

business of the debtor for a limited period, if such operation is in the best interest of the
estate and consistent with the orderly liquidation of the estate." Id.
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a disposal.' 4 ' If the court authorizes the bankruptcy trustee's activity, then
surely the court cannot then hold the trustee personally liable for resulting
contamination. A Chapter 11 trustee needs no approval from the court to
operate the business and therefore cannot use the court approval defense.' 42
By the nature of the Code, however, the Chapter 11 bankruptcy trustee
enjoys limited liability.'43 If a debtor is able to file bankruptcy under
Chapter 11, the entity has, in the judgment of the court, enough funds and
assets to remain operational and attempt reorganization.' If a bankruptcy
trustee is negligent, he could be found personally liable. However, due to
the trustee's protected status, the trustee will more likely only be held
liable to the extent that property of the estate cannot cover the bill."'
Because the estate must have significant value to file Chapter 11, a
trustee's liability should be limited.
CERCLA's treatment of bankruptcy trustees remains unclear when
the trustee exercises the operation provision in the Code. The strong
public policy behind CERCLA should demand a negligence standard rather
than the "intentional" standard applied in Better Brite. A negligence
standard could be established by adding bankruptcy trustees to the common
law trustee negligence provision stated above.
IV. No TRUSTEE LIABILITY WHEN CERCLA
AND FIDUCIARY DUTY CONFLICTS

Trustees should not be forced to choose between incurring liability
for breach of fiduciary duty or for violation of CERCLA. Powerful
rationale exists for exempting trustees from CERCLA liability where
fiduciary duties would conflict. First, not exempting trustees under
CERCLA would place the trustee in a no-win situation and undoubtedly
would damage the trust and estate industry to the extent that persons
capable of being trustees would refuse to serve. Trustees would also
dramatically raise the cost of their services to offset the added liability risk.
Second, a common tenet of fiduciary law is that, absent any wrongdoing,

141.

Jeffrey, supra note 105, at 417.

142. See id at 419.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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the fiduciary should not be placed in a position adverse to the
beneficiary.146 Compliance with CERCLA could force the trustee to breach
a fiduciary duty owed to the beneficiary. Third, by hiring a trustee the
beneficiary expects the trustee to fulfill all the traditional fiduciary duties
owed him. Because the beneficiary agreed that these duties should be
performed on his behalf, the beneficiary should bear the cost of any burden
arising from their fulfillment. Because only one court has addressed the
issue, the trustee again must proceed with little guidance on how to reduce
his liability in situations where fiduciary duties and CERCLA conflict.
' explored the potential conflict between
In re Apco Oil Corp.47
trustees and beneficiaries with regard to CERCLA. The beneficiaries of
the Apco Oil Liquidating Trust petitioned the Delaware Court of Chancery
4
to compel the trustees to make liquidating distributions from the trust. 1
Although the trust contained eighteen million dollars, the trustees would
not even distribute interest income over a three year period due to alleged
CERCLA violations at an oil refinery. 49 EPA had fisted the refinery as
a Superfund site and had identified Apco Oil as a potentially responsible
party. The trustees' attorneys advised the trustees that the trust could be
liable for the cleanup costs of the refinery which could exceed the assets
of the trust. 15 ° The trustees were concerned about personal liability under
the Federal Priority Act'5 ' which allows for trustees to be held liable for
claims brought by the U.S. Government if the trust's assets are insufficient
because the trustees previously distributed funds.'
The trustees were also concerned about complying with their duty.
of loyalty to the beneficiaries of the trust which required them to distribute
assets when requested.'
Holding beneficiary funds in the interest of
another party would result in a breach. The court ordered the funds
distributed on the grounds that a distribution would not result in liability
under the Federal Priority Act because EPA's listing of Apco Oil as a

146. RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TRuSTS,

§ 204 (1959). The trustee is not liable to the

beneficiary for a loss to the trust property not resulting from a breach of a fiduciary duty.
The trustee also owes a duty of absolute loyalty to the beneficiary. Id. § 170.
147. Civ. Action No. 5718, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170 (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 1989).
148. Adams et al., supra note 5, at 38.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 31 U.S.C. § 3713(a) (1988).
152. Adams et al., supra note 5, at 38.
153. Id.
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54
potentially responsible party did not constitute the assertion of a claim.
Under Apco Oil, the fiduciary must comply with his fiduciary duties unless
court. 155
a CERCLA claim has been filed against the estate with the proper
In most cases, this offers little protection for the fiduciary; he will only be
allowed to disregard his fiduciary duties where his actions or another's
would clearly violate CERCLA. Moreover, a trustee cannot always know
the legal implications of his or another's acts, especially with regard to
CERCLA, where liability can be incurred for non-negligent acts.
Although only Apco Oil has confronted this issue, it can arise in
several other contexts. For example, does the duty of loyalty require a
trustee to argue that the trust has no cleanup liability? 156 If so, then the
trustee may be arguing against himself where he is charged with breach of
a fiduciary duty after the trust wins its case.' 7 Where a trustee could be
held personally liable, does a trustee's use of trust assets to pay for the
cleanup suggest self-dealing? Perhaps it should to the extent he cleans up
the property with trust assets. As a trustee, he is proportionately limiting
his risk of liability. In a portfolio-trust driven by profit from real estate
investments, does the trustee breach his fiduciary duty of loyalty by
foregoing the purchase of high investment yield real estate with a minute
chance of CERCLA liability due to his fear of incurring personal liability?
If the fear was speculative, the land turned out to be not in violation of
CERCLA and the property value accrued, the beneficiary certainly has a
strong argument that the trustee's acts were driven by self-interest and
resulted in a detriment to the beneficiary.
Congress should adopt legislation so that these types of conflicts do
not arise. CERCLA should be amended so that a trustee will not be found
liable for acting in good faith and in accordance with traditional duties
applicable to trustee fiduciaries. If the trustee knows or should have
known that fulfilling his fiduciary duty would result in liability under
CERCLA, however, the trustee should be held liable for the results of his
act. This latter provision is consistent with the general principle that
fiduciary duties do not have to be performed where the act itself is illegal
Instead, in these cases, the trustee should have a duty to
or criminal.'
inform the beneficiary of the risk of liability involved in fulfilling the duty.

154.
155.
156.
157.

Apco Oil Corporation, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170 at *8.
Id
Land Mine, supra note 10, at 2862.
Id.

158. HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND

PARTNERSHIP § 90(b) (2d ed. 1990).
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If a competent beneficiary knowingly accepts the risk, the trustee should
be allowed to perform the duty but should be exempt from liability
resulting from such performance. The total risk of liability, after
disclosure, should fall on the beneficiary.
The bankruptcy trustee must also face the tension between fiduciary
duty and CERCLA liability. This tension arises in the bankruptcy context
when the trustee breaches a Code-based duty, triggered by a violation of
CERCLA or state hazardous waste law. In Midlantic National Bank v.
New Jersey Departmentof EnvironmentalProtection,59
' the Court held that
a bankruptcy trustee had a duty to maintain contaminated property of the
estate in order to protect the public health and safety from an imminent
and identifiable harm.
The debtor in Midlantic, the operator of two waste oil treatment
facilities, filed bankruptcy after the discovery of over 400,000 gallons of
oil contaminated with a toxic carcinogen. 6 ' The debtor had stored the
contaminated oil on one of the facility's properties.' 6 ' With no one to buy
the property, the trustee sought to abandon it under section 554 of the
Code'6 2 which allows for the abandonment of "any property of the estate
that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and
benefit to the estate."' 63 When property of the estate is invaluable or
burdensome, the trustee then has a fiduciary duty to abandon it before it
can become a drain on the estate's assets. In Midlantic, the bankruptcy
court approved the abandonment of the debtor's property over the
objections of the State and City of New York who argued that
abandonment would threaten the public's health and safety in violation of
state and federal environmental laws.' 64
The Supreme Court, however, in affirming a Third Circuit opinion,
found otherwise. The Court noted that, before the passage of the Code,
any power to abandon was given to the trustee by the courts, but only in
those situations where state or federal law would not be contravened. 65
The Court believed that Congress intended the concept to be followed in
its entirety: "In codifying the judicially developed rule [abandonment] .
. . Congress also presumably included the established corollary that a
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

474 U.S. 494 (1986).
Id at 497.
Id.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).
Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 498.
Id. at 501.
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trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in violation of certain
state and federal laws.' ' 166 By prohibiting abandonment and requiring the
trustee to maintain the contaminated property in a manner that protected
the public health and safety, the trustee was forced to expend all the assets
of the estate and an additional $20,000 which he personally borrowed and
never recovered. 167 By implication, the Court forced the trustee to act
against the interest of the debtor (and his creditors) in that the trustee
failed to abandon burdensome property and drained the estate assets in the
process. The Code's duty, which can be triggered by CERCLA or state
law, drives a wedge through the relationship of the debtor and the
bankruptcy trustee who are supposed to be working together for the
purpose of achieving a Chapter 11 financial "rehabilitation" or a Chapter
7 "fresh start."
Other decisions have illuminated the tension between the
abandonment duty and the duty to maintain. In In re Stevens,'6 the
trustee attempted to abandon twenty-nine corroding drums of contaminated
oil so that the debtor's estate would not be drained by the cost of removing
and storing the drums.'6 9 Although the bankruptcy court approved the
abandonment, the district court overruled on the basis of Midlantic and
ordered the trustee to properly store the drums. 7 ° Because the debtor was
insolvent when he filed bankruptcy under Chapter 7, the court asked the
trustee to pay for an expensive temporary storage facility in order to hold

the improperly stored contaminants."' Clearly the cost of such a facility
would be a heavy burden to place on the trustee who would have no hope
for indemnification from a bankrupt Chapter 7 estate.
When a bankruptcy trustee has done nothing to cause the
contamination, it is unfair to make him choose between breaching a
fiduciary duty to act in the trustee's best interest to abandon the property

166. Id.The Court also added that the absence of any Code provision suggesting that a

trustee could abandon in violation of state law further supports this interpretation. Id.
167. Joseph L. Cosetti & Jeffrey M. Friedman, Midlantic National Bank Kovacs, and
Penn Terra: The Bankruptcy Code and StateEnvironmentalLaw-PerceivedConflicts and
Optionsfor the Trustee and State EnvironmentalAgencies, 7 J.L. & COM. 65, 70 (1987).
168. 68 B.R. 774 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987).
169. Id.
170. Id.at 775.
171. Id.at 776. The Maine Department of Environmental Protection told the trustee that
the 29 drums containing toxins had to be placed in a storage facility that had "an adequate
roof and walls to protect the drums from rain [plus] an adequate floor with a 6" curbing
made of impervious material." Id.
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or breaching the duty to maintain property in a safe condition for the
public. In this situation, CERCLA's goal to make those who caused the
disposal or accepted the risk of disposal pay for the cleanup is not
satisfied. On the one hand, the trustee has a duty to protect the debtor
from property that can drain the estate's assets, such as property which has
incurred CERCLA liability. On the other hand, the bankrupt who was
responsible for the disposal can shift his liability to the trustee by filing
bankruptcy. His debts, including costs for cleanup, will be discharged,
while the trustee is left burdened with the duty to maintain the property in
a safe condition. If these cases become frequent, a serious blow will be
dealt to the bankruptcy system because trustees will simply refuse
appointments when the debtor's estate holds real estate. Why should a
bankruptcy trustee take even a minimal risk of incurring the costly duty to
maintain?
Some courts have attached limits to the duty to maintain which has
lessened the conflict to some degree. In In re Southern International
Co., 72 the court narrowly construed the duty as one which attaches only
when there is a clearly imminent and identifiable harm. If the harm is
speculative or uncertain to have occurred, the trustee can abandon the
property without fear of liability, even if great harm actually occurred or
occurs later.173

172. 165 B.R. 815 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994).
Southern International Company
("Southern") used a toxic substance to produce home construction products. Id. at 818.
Southern's trade creditors filed an involuntary Chapter 7 petition against it, and the trustee
subsequently abandoned the facility at which the toxic substance was used. Id. Less than
two months later a major rain fall caused the tanks containing the solution to overflow
and contaminate the surrounding property. Id. At trial the issue arose as to whether the
trustee had the power to abandon the facility in light of Midlantic. The court stated that
the duty to maintain property was very narrow and applied only when there was a serious
health risk to the public. Id. at 822. Here, when the trustee abandoned the property, the
debtor had the authority to use the facility and the toxic substance, there had been no spill
and there was no threat of contamination. Id. at 823. Thus, the court ruled that the duty
did not apply in this case due to a lack of an imminent danger at the time of
abandonment. Id. The court did seem concerned that the spill could have been avoided
had the trustee simply kept the machinery in working order. Id. Perhaps, if the trustee's
abandonment power is used in the face of an obvious potential danger, even though not
imminent, the duty will be enforced anyway through the.court's equity powers under §
105. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988).
173. S. Intl. Co., 165 B.R. at 823.
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In In re Franklin Signal Corp.'74 the court narrowed the extent of
the duty by only requiring the trustee to "take at least minimal steps to
protect the public.' 75 The trustee took "minimum steps" by hiring an
environmental specialist to determine the content of the drums and the
cost of cleanup. 76 Under Franklin, the trustee's duty was limited to
establishing the scope of the problem at hand and did not require physical
acts to mitigate the problem. Yet, by not requiring the trustee to protect
the public from the property by taking preventative measures, the holding
is completely inconsistent with the clear wording of the duty in Midlantic
which calls for actual protection. Thus, it is doubtful other courts will
adopt the "minimum steps" approach.
In In re Microfab177 the court asserted that the financial ability of
the trustee must play a limiting role on the duty in stating that "the trustee
cannot be ordered to comply with a cleanup obligation that he does not
have the financial resources to satisfy. ''I 7 S Yet, basing the extent of an
entity's duty on its ability to pay is inherently unfair; the law establishes
duties based on certain relationships, not on wealth. In sum, both limiting
factors reflect the court's sympathy for the trustee's unfortunate position,
but neither are based on any provision or underlying logic in CERCLA,
state hazardous waste law or the Code. To clear up the extent of the duty
and to prevent this conflict between the Code and hazardous waste law
from destroying the trustee position in the Code, Congress must fix the
problem.
One possible solution would be to amend CERCLA so that the duty
to maintain could not be attached to the bankruptcy trustee except where
he intentionally exercised certain powers with knowledge that a release of
hazardous substances was likely. Another possibility would be to create
a Code section which establishes standards for when property can be
abandoned and who must pay cleanup costs when property of the estate
Any potential liability for the trustee would be
cannot be abandoned.'
known ahead of time, and the risk could be factored into the cost of
providing the service. Congress could also solve the problem by amending
the Code to prevent the discharge of debts under Chapter 7 or the
acceptance of a reorganization plan under Chapter 11 until the debtor has
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

65 B.R. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
Id. at 273.
Id.
105 B.R. 161 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
Id. at 169.
Jeffrey, supra note 105, at 436.
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established cleanup plans. 8

Until a solution is found, unnecessary

litigation over the duty to maintain and the abandonment provision will
continue.
V. PREVENTATIVE MEASURES

Until proper legislation passes, trustees must take certain steps in
order to reduce their risk of liability. First, before purchasing or accepting
title to real estate, trustees should always exercise "due diligence" in order
to take advantage of the innocent purchaser defense.' 8 ' The defense may
be raised by private parties who take title to real estate provided that,
among other things: (1) the disposal of hazardous substances on the
property occurred prior to the transfer of title and (2) the landowner did
not know or have reason to know, at the time of the transfer, that
To establish the
hazardous substances were disposed of at the facility.'
latter provision, "due diligence" in investigating the property must be
performed. Because trustees will usually take title to property in a
83
This
commercial context, the strictest standards will be applied.'
includes
generally
which
audit
necessarily requires a phase I environmental
searching the land records to determine the prior owners and prior uses of
the property, a walk-through of the property and a full investigation of
anything that may look suspicious, and the taking of limited ground
samples to check for traces of hazardous substances.' 84 If the audit comes

180. Id.at 437.

181. The innocent purchaser defense requires a contractual agreement with a third party.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988). However, the trust agreement may not satisfy the
elements of a contract. For instance, if the trustee is not given consideration for his
services, a contract may not be found. Gratuitous trustee services are not uncommon in
noncommerical contexts between families and friends. To the extent a trust agreement
does not constitute a contract, the defense cannot be used. See id.
182. Id.§§ 9601(35), 9607(b)(3).
183. H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3279, 3280. If the trustee takes the property in a private context or by inheritance or
bequest, as is usually the case for testamentary trustees, a lower standard will be applied
on the reasoning that the "purchaser" is not as knowledgeable as commercial purchasers,
who buy and sell land routinely, on what methods should be used to investigate the
property and what certain discovered information ("red flags") should imply about the
property. Id.
184. Denise Rodosevich, The Expansive Reach of CERCLA Liability: PotentialLiability
of Executors of Wills and Inter Vivos and Testamentary Trustees, 55 ALB. L. REV. 143,
163-64 (1991).
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up negative and no red flags are raised, then "innocence" should be
established.18 5 It should be strongly noted, however, that without such an
audit, "due diligence" will be hard to prove, as such audits are now seen
as commonplace in the trade.
Second, the trustee should demand risk-shifting provisions in the
trust agreement. An indemnification provision from the beneficiary or the
settlor for environmental problems which extend beyond the trust assets
and a provision requiring the beneficiary or settlor to respond to CERCLA
cleanups in the first degree are provisions which can be used to limit or
prevent trustee liability. The one drawback is that contractual provisions
cannot preclude the initial incurrence of liability for the trustee; that is,
they can only be used by the trustee in a later action to enforce the terms
of the contract. Furthermore, courts tend to construe narrowly such
provisions so that only the most explicit and clear indemnity language will
18 6
be enforced.

Third, after Garbage Services, trustees should be wary of the
powers granted to them in the trust agreements. If the trustee is only
going to manage the financial affairs of the trust estate, any language
authorizing him to exercise management power over the property or
facility should be omitted. Such language could give the trustee the
capacity to operate a facility which, under Garbage Services, is sufficient
to constitute owner status.
VII. REAUTHORIZATION
Although CERCLA was up for reauthorization in 1994, no action
was taken before Congress recessed. In the next congressional session,
changes to CERCLA seem probable. Senator Max Baucus (D-Mont.)
stated that, due to the problems with the current law, nearly all parties
affected by CERCLA "appear to be united in their desire to complete
reauthorization. ' ,187 Furthermore, industry who, as the law's target often
works hard to delay such legislation, is pushing hard for reauthorization
because the new law is expected to result in business savings.' 8
185. If red flags are raised, a phase- II environmental audit, which is a more

comprehensive investigation including a multitude of sampling tests, will be necessary.
If all red flags are dismissed after a phase 1I audit, innocence should be established.
186. Robert Boese, Indemnity Agreements and CERCLA, 37 LA. B. J. 36, 37 (1989).

187. CERCLA ReauthorizationCalledPossibleifGiven Push by Clinton Administration,
24 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1340 (Nov. 19, 1993).
188. Id.
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The Interagency CERCLA Reauthorization Policy Committee, a
task force including White House officials and representatives from several
federal agencies is considering proposals.189 The committee's purpose is
to present a reauthorization bill to Congress. 9° The two major proposals
have been submitted by the Treasury Department and EPA.
The Treasury Department has proposed a reformation of the
liability scheme. A binding allocation system based on behavior would
replace strict, joint and several liability based on status. 9 ' The plan calls
for the appointment of administrative law judges ("ALJs") who would hear
evidence, determine which parties are responsible for contamination and
allocate cleanup costs based on each party's behavior.' 92 Superfund would
pay for the cost of covering orphan shares' 93 and that of parties absolved
of liability. 19 4 The rationale behind the plan is that the ALJs' allocation

would preclude CERCLA litigation and thus would allow more money for
cleanups. Not surprisingly, the major criticism of this proposal is that it
will require a tax increase to cover the cost of providing more ALJs' and
the payment of cleanup costs when parties are absolved or orphan shares
are designated.' 95
EPA supports an allocation scheme based on responsibility as well
but wants it to be non-binding.' 96 Responsible parties could either pay the
cleanup costs allocated to them or decide not to be bound by the judgment.
There would be incentives to participate, though, such as an increased
allocation of cleanup costs if the AL's decision later proved to be correct.
The major criticism of the non-binding allocation scheme is that it may not
result in a large decrease in litigation costs, which is a major attraction for
Congress. 197 EPA, unlike the Treasury Department, is also considering
189. See Superfund: Interagency Policy Sets Schedule for Recommending Overhaul of
CERCLA, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1133 (Oct. 15, 1993).
190. Id.
191. Superfund: Treasury Department Liability ProposalIs Criticizedby Congressional
Leaders, 24 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1067 (Oct. 8, 1993)
192. Superfund: Administration Called Inconsistent on CERCLA Reauthorization, 24
Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1135 (Oct. 15, 1993) [hereinafter Superfund: Administration].
193. A percentage of the cleanup costs for which it is unknown who is accountable.
194. Superfund: Administration, supra note 192, at 1135.
195. Id. EPA conservatively estimates the implementation of the proposal could require
a tax increase of 14.4 billion dollars over the next ten years. The critics of the bill
include Senator Frank R. Lautenberg (D-N.J.), Congressman Norman Y. Mineta (D-Cal.),
Congressman John D. Dingell (D-Mich.) and Congressman Al Smith (D-Wash.).
196. Superfund Reauthorization, 24 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1663, 1664 (Jan. 21, 1994).
197. Id.
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exemptions for trustees in certain circumstances which have not yet been
disclosed.'98
Some groups strongly support the Superfund's present liability
scheme. A Department of Justice ("DOJ") representative stated, "we are
firmly committed to strict, joint and several liability. Any proposal that
does not include these elements will only increase superfund's transaction
costs."' 99 The DOJ believes that settlement is the largest reducer of
transaction costs and that the proposals to eliminate the present liability
scheme would discourage settlements. 200 Furthermore, Congressman Al
Swift (D-Wash.) has stated that eliminating the present liability scheme
would outrage and alienate the national environmental organizations,
making such proposals difficult to pass.20
A top EPA official has stated that the executive proposal presented
to Congress will be a compromise of the EPA and Treasury Department
proposals.20 2 The result should be some form of allocation scheme based
on responsibility. Should the legislation pass, the trustee would no longer
be concerned about whether he fit into the definitions of owner or operator
but would instead be concerned with whether he was responsible for the
disposal. This scheme would confront all the issues addressed here and
decide them in favor of the trustee. Every argument calling for trustee
protection in this paper is based on the premise that, although the trustee
may tenuously fit into the liability definitions, he should not be held liable
because he either is not responsible for the contamination or did not accept
the risk of liability. Of course, the trustee should not be completely
exempted from liability. The trustee should be held liable where he is
responsible or where he accepts the risk of liability. Because EPA's
proposal contains situational exemptions, they most likely address these
same concerns.
Trustees have not been hit hard with CERCLA liability yet.
However, this will most likely change if clear and comprehensive
legislation addressing the problems presented here is not passed. EPA's
search for deep pockets to clean up the thousands of existing contaminated
sites will undoubtedly lead to many more suits against trustees. When this
happens, the trust industry will suffer a serious blow. Trustees will likely
198. Id.
199. Superfund: Administration, supra note 192, at 1135.
200. Id
201. See CERCLA Reauthorization, supra note 187, at 1340.
202. Superfund: "Long List" of Liability Changes to Law Being Proposedby EPA, Top
Official Says, 24 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1473 (Dec. 3, 1993).
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refuse to serve when the trust contains real estate. Trustees servicing
existing trusts will probably step down if asked to purchase real estate,
especially if red flags have been raised in an environmental audit or
hazardous waste is created on the property. Trustees who do accept such
risky positions will demand exorbitant rates to protect against their
potential liability.
This type of impact on a commonly used commercial service could
have indirect effects on the economy. Trusts commonly used to hold or
separate real estate for business and estate planning purposes could cease
to exist. The bankruptcy system may have to be altered so that trustees are
not used, which could require an entire rewriting of the Code. These
consequences may seem far-reaching, but they are realistic developments
if clear and comprehensive legislation is not enacted. Congress should be
careful not to hurry through a flawed or ambiguous legislative package in
the next session, as was done in 1980, in order to prolong debate on more
controversial issues such as health care and tax reform, or trustees could
be in a situation no better than they are in now.20 3

203. Superfund: Administration, supra note 192, at 1135.

